Resource Law Notes Newsletter, no. 32, fall issue, Aug. 1994 by University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Resource Law Notes: The Newsletter of the 
Natural Resources Law Center (1984-2002) Newsletters 
Fall 1994 
Resource Law Notes Newsletter, no. 32, fall issue, Aug. 1994 
University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/resource_law_notes 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Energy Policy Commons, Environmental Law 
Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Natural Resources and 
Conservation Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Natural Resources Management and Policy 
Commons, Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, Public Policy Commons, 
Water Law Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons 
Citation Information 
Resource Law Notes: The Newsletter of the Natural Resources Law Center, no. 32, fall issue, Aug. 1994 




RESOURCE LAW NOTES, no. 32, fall issue, Aug. 1994 
(Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law). 
 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson 
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the 
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law 
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School. 
 
Number 32 Fall Issue, August 1994
W ho Governs the Public Lands:
Washington? the West? the Community?
Second Annual Western Lands conference scheduled fo r September 28-30
Shifting policy objectives and manage­
ment approaches for the public lands of the 
West are provoking heated debate about 
how these decisions should be made and 
implemented. Are these policy directions a 
reflection of the “New West” or are they, in 
fact, a declaration of “war on the West”? 
Somewhere between these polarities of view, 
efforts are underway to open dialogue and 
reach consensus.
This second annual western lands 
conference will explore federal initiatives 
including the Colorado Grazing 
Roundtable and Rangeland ’94, Option 9 
and the Pacific Northwest forests, bypass 
flows and Colorado national forests, and 
wilderness protection in Utah.
Speakers from federal agencies, from 
states, from groups concerned with the use 
and protection of the public lands, and 
from academia will discuss these initiatives 
and issues that they raise regarding control 
of the western public lands.
Registration will cost $295 until 
September 20; $325 late registration 
thereafter. The fee for any level of govern­
ment (federal, state, local, tribal) is $225 
($255 late). Academics and representatives 
of not-for-profit groups may come for $150  
($175 late).
NOTE: Because registration will be 
limited to 200 people, prepayment or valid 
organizational Purchase Orders will be 
required.
Inside
Conserving Biodiversity on 
Private Land, by Professor 
David Farrier, page 5
Secretary o f  the Interior Bruce Babbitt (center) is flank ed by Colorado Governor Roy Romer (right) and  
Stan Broome o f  Montrose, m ember o f  the G overnor’s group, a t meetings on proposals to raise graz ing fees  
on pub lic lands, conducted  in Grand Junction , Colorado, N ovember 1993. Photo: Al Gibes, Grand 
Jun ction  Daily Sentinel.
Hot Topics Lunch Series Resumes
Implications for developers and for 
local governments o f the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Dolan v. City o f  T igard  
will lead off “Hot Topics in Natural 
Resources,” the Center’s popular 
Continuing Legal Education lunch series 
in downtown Denver,
On Monday, September 19, CU Law 
Dean Gene R. Nichol will give an 
overview of the Dolan decision, with 
further analysis offered by Tom 
Strickland, attorney with Brownstein, 
Hyatt, Farber and Strickland, and by 
Michael Shultz, Loveland City Attorney.
Hot Topics will again be held in the 
32nd floor conference room of the 
Denver law firm Holland & Hart, our 
gracious hosts. A registration flyer for the 
Hot Topic series will be mailed to the 
Denver-Boulder metro area. If you are 
outside that area and wish information 
about Hot Topics, please call Kathy 
Taylor, (303) 492-1288.
The Hot Topic Friday, October 21, 
will be on “PUD No. 1 o f Jefferson 
County and City o f Tacoma v. Washing­
ton Department o f Ecology: The U.S.
con tinued  on page 11
W ho Governs the Public Lands: 
Washington? the West? the Community? 
Agenda:
Wednesday, Sept. 28, 1994
Decision making and the public 
lands
Robert Davis, Institute for Behavioral 
Sciences, University o f Colorado
Interest group participation in 
public land planning and decision 
making processes
Professor Sally Fairfax, College o f 
Natural Resources, University o f 
California, Berkeley
Constitutional and Congressional 
requirements directing public lands 
decision making
Professor Joseph M. Feller, Arizona 
State University, Tempe
Local and national interests in 
using public rangeland: The Colo­
rado Grazing Roundtable and 
Rangeland ’94
Moderator and overview: Frank 
Gregg, Professor Emeritus, Water 
Resources Research, University o f 
Arizona, Tucson
The Colorado Process: a view from 
inside
Maggie Fox, Sierra Club Southwest 
Regional Representative, Boulder




Cathy Carlson, National Wildlife 
Federation, Washington, DC
Bill Meyers, National Cattlemen’s 
Association, Washington, DC
Thursday, Sept. 29, 1994
Local and national interests in 
using public forests
Moderator and overview: Charles 
Wilkinson, Professor o f Law, Univer­
sity o f Colorado, Boulder
View from the Forest Service 
Lessons from the Pacific Northwest I
Norm Johnson, School o f Forestry, 
Oregon State University
Lessons from the Pacific Northwest II
Margaret Shannon, University o f  
Washington
Local and national interests in 
using water on public lands
Moderator and overview: David 
Getches, Professor o f Law, University 
o f Colorado
Bypass flows in Colorado national 
forests
Panel
Doug Robotham, Assistant Director, 
Water Policy, Colorado Department 
o f Natural Resources
Skip Underwood, Forest Supervisor, 
Arapaho and Roosevelt National 
Forests
David Harrison, Attorney, Moses, 
Wittemyer, Harrison & Woodruff, 
Boulder
Dan Luecke, Regional Director, 
Environmental Defense Fund,
Boulder
Local and national interests in 
establishing wilderness areas: the 
Utah experience
Moderator: Larry MacDonnell, 
Director, Natural Resources Law 
Center
Overview:
Jeffrey Appels, Attorney, Salt Lake 
City
Panel
Michael Matz, Executive Director, 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
Bill Hedden, Vice-Chair, Grand 
County Council, Utah
Friday, Sept. 30, 1994
Searching for integration: some 
models
Moderator: Teresa Rice, Senior Staff 
Attorney, Natural Resources Law 
Center
Integrating public land and local 
community planning objectives: the 
Rocky Mountain National Park
(
Homer Rouse, Superintendent, Rocky 
Mountain National Park
The Canyon Country Partnership 
Bill Hedden, Chairman, The Canyon 
Country Partnership, Utah
Community-Public Lands Partner­
ship: The Montezuma County 
Federal Lands Program
Michael Preston, Federal Lands 
Coordinator, Montezuma County, 
Colorado
Putting it together: implications 
and directions
Moderator: Judy Jacobsen, Associate 
Director, Natural Resources Law 
Center
Ed Marston, Publisher, High Country 
News
Panel
Maggie Fox, Sierra Club Southwest 
Regional Representative, Boulder
Phil Burgess, Director, Center for the 
New West, Denver
John Lawrence, Staff Director, House i 
Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs (invited)
Stewart Udall, former Secretary o f the 
Interior
Regulatory Takings and 
Resources Conference 
Draws Overflow Crowd
The Center’s annual June 
conference attracted about 250  
registrants and speakers from 31 
states, the District o f  Columbia, and 
two other countries to consider 
“Regulatory Takings and Resources: 
W hat Are the Constitutional 
Limits?” Cosponsored by the law 
school’s Byron H. White Center for 
American Constitutional Study, the 
conference was very well received. 
The 488 page notebook o f speakers’ 
outlines and materials, and audio- 
tapes from the 3-day conference are 




J o  Evans o f  the Audubon Society (left) w ith Ruth Wright o f  the Colorado 
House o f  Representatives.
Professor Carol M. Rose, Yale Law School, enjoys the barbeque after delivering 
the keynote address Monday.
Clyde Martz, attorney w ith Davis, Graham dr Stubbs, Denver, and  fo rm er  
Solicitor w ith the U.S. Dept, o f  Interior, expounds on a po in t w ith speaker 
Larry M cBride o f  Freedman, Levy, Kroll dr Simonds (left).
Speakers Mark Squillace, University o f  Wyoming 
College o f  Law, and  Brian Gray, Hastings College 
o f  the Law, relax a t F lagstaff M ountain cookout.
I. M ichael Heyman, Dept, o f  the Interior, 
Washington, DC, addresses M anagement 
Approaches to Takings Issues.




Report on Water 
Banks
In another o f its research projects 
examining water reallocation in the West, 
the Center has produced a detailed 
analysis o f water banking experience 
including a recommended framework for 
establishing such banks. Water Banking in 
th e West provides thorough evaluations o f 
water bank experiences in Idaho and 
California, the new bank in Texas, and 
the recharging o f aquifers as a means o f 
banking water. It contains an extensive 
examination o f key features o f water 
banks and evaluates matters such as price 
and allocation from an economic 
perspective. A  recommended framework 
is proposed and then applied against 
three banks in the proposal or early 
implementation stage: the Lower 
Colorado River Interstate Bank, the 
Texas Water Bank, and the Fort Lyon 
Canal Bank in Colorado.
Principal investigator for the project, 
one o f the last supported through the 
United States Geological Survey under 
the now defunded Water Resources 
Research Act, was Larry MacDonnell. 
Other primary authors include Professor 
Charles Howe, University o f Colorado 
Department o f Economics; Kathleen 
Miller, National Center for Atmospheric 
Research; Center attorney Teresa Rice, 
and Sarah Bates, now with the Grand 
Canyon Trust.
Water Banking in th e West is available 




Associates who have contributed 
to the Center in the past year are 
invited to join NRLC staff and 
conference speakers for a special 
breakfast Thursday, September 29.
If you wish to donate and be 
included for the breakfast, please 
use the form on page 11 or call 
Kathy Taylor at the Center for 
additional details.
As always the Center gratefully 
acknowledges all those who have 
contributed to our support.
I---------------------♦ ------------ 1
Another Center o f Interest
The Centre for Petroleum and 
Mineral Law and Policy established in 
1977 at the University o f Dundee, 
Scotland is now offering an interdisci­
plinary and internationally oriented 
graduate studies program focusing on 
natural resources, energy and environ­
ment. The Centre’s degree programs 
combining law, policy, economics and 
finance, include diploma, LL.M, MSc 
(Energy Studies), MBA (Oil and Gas 
Management/Mineral Resources 
Management) and Ph.D.
The degree programs are stuctured 
in a very flexible way so as to allow 
working professionals to participate.
Current research at the Centre focuses 
on environmental regulation o f 
natural resources/energy; mineral 
taxation; EC energy law; international 
investment and finance and legislative 
and institutional reform in the ex­
socialist countries.
The Centre’s Executive Director is 
Thomas Walde, Professor o f Petro­
leum, Mineral and International 
Investment Law, formerly the 
principal UN adviser on natural 
resources/energy/investment legisla­
tion. For more information, please 
contact the Centre on Tel. no. +44 
382 344300  or FAX +44 382 322578.
Summer ’94 NRLC Research 
Assistants
Center RAs jo stle  over scarce ph on e lines in cram ped  quarters. From l e f t  
M ary Beth Searles, Paul Cort, K elly Custer, Eric Fisher a n d  M ichael Fife.
The Center’s active 
research program 
depends heavily on 
the work o f law 
school student 
research assistants.
This summer the 
Center was fortunate 
to have five highly 
qualified student 
assistants.
Paul Cort came to 
CU Law School from 
a position as an 
environmental 
consultant in San 
Francisco. He holds 
both a bachelors and 
masters degree in civil engineering.
Before entering law school, Kelly 
Custer worked in Florida and Wisconsin 
as an environmental specialist for state 
environmental regulatory agencies. W ith 
degrees in biology and marine ecology, 
she worked on wetland regulation and 
mitigation, water quality, and endangered 
species.
Michael Fife’s interest in natural 
resources, and particularly water issues, 
grew from his earlier years in Southern 
California. W ith a masters degree in 
philosophy, he is now interested in 
environmental issues.
Eric Fisher hales from the New York 
City banking industry, where he put his 
economics degree to work. He is hopeful
that a career in natural resource law will 
more closely match his personal interests.
M ary Beth Searles also has an 
economics degree, but her work experi­
ence has been more as a journalist. As a 
technical assistant for an energy consult­
ing firm, she wrote and edited reports on 
current energy issues. As Speakers Chair 
for the student Environmental Law 
Society, she will no doubt continue to use 
her journalism skills.
Student research focused primarily on 
experience to date in watershed initiatives 
throughout the western states and an 
analysis o f efforts to repair environmental 
problems caused, in part, by Bureau o f 
Reclamation projects in selected western 
river basins.
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Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land
' David Farrier1
The issue of how we go about persuading 
(private landowners to conserve biodiversity is 
becoming increasingly pressing. The United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 
which entered into force on December 29, 
1993, requires parties to “regulate or manage” 
species, genetic and ecosystem diversity not 
only within protected areas but outside them 
as well. The United States is a signatory and 
Australia has ratified. At the same time the 
message from conservation biologists is that 
existing areas of publicly owned land are not 
adequate when it comes to the conservation of 
representative ecosystems. Land in both the 
U.S. and Australia has been reserved or 
acquired on an ad hoc basis, with political 
factors playing a significant role, and objectives 
other than nature conservation (e.g. recreation) 
frequently determining the precise areas set 
aside. The fact that unrepresented ecosystems 
are often located in fragments on privately 
owned land means that management by a 
centralized agency will be difficult even if we 
had the stomach for compulsory purchase.
Where ecosystems have been set aside on 
public land, there is increasing concern that 
nature conservation is being compromised by 
other management objectives, such as 
recreation and timber production. This is 
hardly surprising, given the fact that for most 
public land designations, nature conservation 
must compete with other objectives.
Where land is ostensibly being managed for 
purposes of nature conservation, management 
may still be influenced by competing consider­
ations, as where a “hands off’ management 
regime allows certain species popular with 
tourists or hunters to thrive in the absence of 
predators, producing fundamental distortions 
in ecosystems.
Even if existing areas of publicly owned 
land along with those to be acquired in the 
near future, did come to represent the diversity 
of ecosystems, they would need also to be large 
enough to retain minimum viable populations 
of plants and animals. Where ecosystems are 
represented on public land, the areas protected 
may not be large enough to maintain in the 
longer term adequate populations of wide- 
ranging large carnivores and herbivores.
At a minimum, biodiversity conservation 
calls for corridors over privately owned land 
linking areas of protected land together, to 
allow species to migrate between them. Unless 
substantial buffers are provided, large 
protected ecosystems in public ownership will 
always be vulnerable to edge effects stemming 
from increased exposure to sunlight and other 
spillovers from surrounding areas. These 
buffers will frequently have to be on land in 
private ownership.
Yet the provision of buffer zones around 
core areas and wildlife corridors connecting 
them, may be a futile gesture in the longer 
term. There is increasing evidence that global
D avid Farrier
warming will have dramatic effects on 
ecosystem boundaries as the relative speed of 
temperature shifts in comparison with changes 
in the past, leaving vegetation with insufficient 
time to adapt. The implications of global 
warming are that we can no longer take a 
segmented approach to biodiversity conserva­
tion, with nature conservation ghettos 
interspersed within a landscape devoted to 
commercial production.
My concern is with the policy instruments 
required to modify the behavior of private 
landowners. Market forces generally provide 
private landholders with little incentive to 
conserve biodiversity, and where market 
incentives do exist, such as hunting or 
recreation, they may produce distortions in the 
way in which ecosystems are managed and end 
up actually diminishing diversity.
1 will consider in turn the use of incentive 
schemes designed to induce biodiversity 
conservation under the Farm Bills and private 
conservation easements; command and control 
regulation; and the use of management 
payments as an alternative to compensation in 
the context of regulation.
Conservation by consensus under 
the Farm Bills
Governments may operate in the market 
place themselves, not by purchasing title to 
land but by purchasing land use restrictions 
designed to conserve biodiversity. These can
1 Professor David Farrier (LL.B. London 
School of Economics; Diploma in Criminology, 
Cambridge University; LL.M. Columbia 
University) is a Visiting Research Fellow with 
the Natural Resources Law Center, January- 
October 1994, on sabbatical from the University 
of Wollongong Faculty of Law, Australia.
This is an edited version of a paper which 
will eventually be issued as a Center Occasional 
Paper. Prof. Farrier welcomes requests for his 
full draft paper for comment.
take the form either of simple contractual 
agreements, or conservation easements which 
will bind all who obtain title to the land in the 
future.
There are a number of examples of such 
schemes in the United States. The Environ­
mental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program 
(ECARP) consists of the conservation reserve 
program (CRP) and the wetland reserve 
program (WRP). The CRP is by far the most 
significant government commitment to 
environmental programs in terms of resource 
allocation. Over 36,400 acres were enrolled in 
the first twelve sign-ups, representing a total 
financial commitment by the Federal Govern­
ment of over $19-5 billion, and an annual 
commitment peaking at $1.9 billion in 1996. 
In Colorado there are 6,207 contracts covering 
nearly 2 million acres and involving a total 
financial commitment of nearly $1 billion. 
(Kenneth A. Cook, So Long CRP, Environ­
mental Working Group, 1994, 4-5, 18, 22).
The origins of the CRP lie in concerns 
about the overproduction of certain agricul­
tural commodities and land degradation. Only 
after 1990, with the expansion of eligible 
categories of land beyond highly erodible 
cropland to include croplands to be devoted to 
permanent wildlife habitat has the program 
become marginally more sensitive to the 
demands of biodiversity conservation, in the 
form of “wildlife” conservation.
The CRP relies primarily on contracts, 
which are more vulnerable than easements. 
Moreover, contracts are ordinarily only for a 
period of ten years, although this can be 
extended to a period of fifteen years where the 
land is devoted to hardwood trees, shelterbelts, 
windbreaks, or wildlife corridors. The CRP is 
essentially a short-term land retirement 
program, and significant problems are 
anticipated when the first batches of enrolled 
land come out of contract in 1995-
Under the terms of the CRP contract, an 
approved conservation plan must be imple­
mented, and this may include a requirement 
for the establishment of permanent wildlife 
habitat. Highly erodible cropland must, for 
example, be put under “approved vegetative 
cover, or water cover for the enhancement of 
wildlife.”
The CRP suffers from all the shortcomings 
of a program which has had tacked on to it a 
thin veneer of concern with biodiversity, after 
starting out its life with very different 
objectives. The Wetlands Reserve Program, on 
the other hand, is more directly relevant to 
biodiversity conservation, although its impact 
is confined to a narrow category of ecosystems.
The WRP is concerned with restoring to 
their original condition wetlands which have 
been modified by agricultural activity or 
completely converted, before December 23, 
1985. The likelihood and cost of restoration 
must be taken into consideration in deciding
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which areas to enroll. The owner of the land 
must be prepared to grant a perpetual or 30 
year easement* or for the maximum duration 
allowed by State law. Priority is to be given to 
easements based on the value which they have 
for protecting and enhancing habitat for 
migratory birds and other wildlife.
The focus of the CRP and the WRP is on 
converting existing intensive land uses to more 
environmentally sensitive uses by restoring 
land already in agricultural production, rather 
than seeking to dissuade landholders from 
converting land to more intensive uses in the 
first place. There is a powerful argument that 
we would do better to concentrate limited 
resources on conserving relatively undisturbed 
land rather than attempting to restore 
degraded or even destroyed ecosystems.
The retention of relatively undisturbed 
areas is addressed by the Sodbuster and 
Swampbuster provisions of the Farm Bill. 
Sodbuster threatens farmers with loss of 
agricultural program benefits where any 
agricultural commodity is produced “on a field 
on which highly erodible land is predominate”, 
unless this is in accordance with an approved 
conservation plan. The focus here is squarely 
on the prevention of land degradation (land 
conservation) rather than the conservation of 
biodiversity. The operating assumption is that 
highly erodible land can be brought into 
production, with biodiversity substantially 
destroyed in the process, as long as there is a 
conservation plan in place, designed to 
conserve the land base rather than its 
biodiversity.
Swampbuster also threatens landholders 
with loss of program benefits, the relevant 
event here being conversion of a wetland “for N 
the purpose, or to have the effect, of making 
the production of an agricultural commodity 
possible”. There is no equivalent to the 
substantial exemption under the Sodbuster 
provisions which allows cropping on highly 
erodible land to go ahead provided that it is in 
accordance with an approved conservation 
plan. In spite of this, Swampbuster, has 
fundamental shortcomings when it comes to 
biodiversity conservation.
First, it has nothing to say to those 
converting wetland for purposes other than 
cropping. Only the command and control 
provisions of section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act (see below) stand in the way of the same 
landholder selling the same land for real estate 
development, or putting it to pasture and 
destroying most of its biodiversity value in the 
process. Secondly, Swampbuster has no hold 
over landholders who do not grow program 
crops or are prepared to forego program 
'benefits.
Thirdly, to landholders accustomed to 
receiving program benefits and dependent 
upon them, it presents as coercion. If we look 
beneath Swampbuster’s rhetoric of command 
and control, we find an entirely voluntary 
program, offering program benefits on certain 
conditions. But this is not how landholders 
perceive it. The result is that Swampbuster has 
all the disadvantages associated with command
and control regulation - landholder hostility 
and enforcement problems - and none of the 
advantages possessed by policy instruments 
which tempt with carrots rather than beat 
with sticks.
Finally, imposing land use restrictions is 
only the first step towards biodiversity 
conservation: particularly where ecosystems 
comprise fragments, active management is 
required, especially in relation to external 
impacts. Swampbuster does not allow for the 
payment of incentives to landholders for 
ongoing management of ecosystems.
Management is perhaps even more crucial 
in relation to restored ecosystems. Both the 
CRP and the WRP, in addition to offering 
compensation, provide for cost share in 
relation to the in itia l establishm ent o f  
conservation measures. However, manage­
ment payments are not contemplated under 
the CRP, except where land is to he set aside 
for the production of hardwood trees, 
windbreaks, shelterbelts or wildlife corridors, 
when payments for maintenance can be made. 
Only the WRP requires landholders to make 
long-term commitments in easements to 
manage restored wetlands in accordance with 
a conservation plan, and appears to contem­
plate that they will receive cost-share 
payments for this.
Conservation through private 
agreement
Apart from government initiatives to 
influence land use through agreements with 
landholders, activities on a growing area of 
land in the United States are regulated 
through agreements reached between 
landholders and private nonprofit organiza­
tions, such as the Nature Conservancy and 
land trusts.
Legal requirements for a valid conservation 
easement vary from state to state. For present
purposes, however, it can be taken as an 
agreement regarding land use, designed to 
protect natural resources, binding not only on 
the original landholder who agrees to the 
obligations, but also on those who hold title to 
the land thereafter.
Allowing conservation easements to be held 
by publicly non-accountable private organiza­
tions is alleged to conflict with the policy that 
landholders should be able to shift land uses 
according to current market choices. This 
ignores the fact that development places 
irreversible dead hand ties on land by 
substantially confining the uses to which it can 
be put through physica l modification, by 
degradation and destruction of ecosystems. 
Those who restrict development through 
easements actually keep open options for 
future generations, the reality always being that 
future law-makers cannot be bound by prior 
lega l arrangements.
On the other hand, the number of land 
trusts taking conservation easements on an ad 
hoc basis, with their disparate objectives, 
creates difficulties for any attempt to produce 
integrated and coordinated planning in this 
area. At present the only means by which these 
arrangements are made publicly accountable is 
through the tax system, which often provides 
the incentive to landholders to enter into an 
easement.
Land management objectives adopted by a 
particular trust may conflict with desirable 
land use from a public interest perspective. For 
example, an easement may be taken over land 
in order to gain or maintain public access, or 
even to preserve it as farm land, when the 
public interest could require restrictions on 
access, and restoration of ecosystems.
Provision for ongoing management of the 
land is another crucial issue. There is a danger 
that particular land trusts may end up 
focusing on bringing land under conservation
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easement, with little attention paid to 
continuing stewardship responsibilities. Apart 
from this, where small local organizations are 
involved, they will simply not have the 
expertise to set up and implement the detailed 
monitoring and management mechanisms 
| required to promote biodiversity conservation.
Finally there is the matter of enforcement. 
Land trusts emphasize voluntarism. Formal 
legal proceedings are seen very much as a last 
resort. The fact that a program starts out in the 
realm of consensus, however, does not mean 
that at a later point it may not confront the 
landholder as coercion. This becomes 
increasingly likely where the landholder who 
originally granted a conservation easement sells 
the land.
The Nature Conservancy emphasizes that if 
the issue of enforcement comes up, it is already 
too late because the damage has been done, 
and restoration is extremely difficult or 
impossible. Although easements are moni­
tored, this is usually only possible on an annual 
basis, and the main emphasis is placed on 
maintaining good relationships with landhold­
ers to forestall transgressions.
The Nature Conservancy, in a special 
position because of its size and levels of 
expertise, currently holds nearly 600 conserva­
tion easements, generally designed to protect 
endangered species and natural communities 
which occur on privately owned land. Areas 
are identified by using information from the 
Conservancy’s Natural Heritage Programs - 
elaborate inventories of the biological and 
ecological features of a particular region - and 
selected for protection by an elaborate ranking 
| system.
The primary aim of the Conservancy’s 
easements is to protect land from development 
pressures which will degrade or destroy existing 
ecosystems; it is particularly concerned to 
restrict real estate development. While 
conservation easements reserve a right of entry 
to the Conservancy to monitor ecosystems and 
compliance with the terms of the agreement, 
management arrangements are generally left to 
be negotiated on an ad hoc basis.
A private organization such as the Conser­
vancy has the unique advantage of being able 
to negotiate with private landholders against 
the backdrop of government regulation, while 
still remaining committed to a philosophy of 
voluntariness and cooperation. The existence 
of command and control legislation, such as 
the Endangered Species Act, may, for example, 
play a vital role in bringing landholders to the 
bargaining table. By contrast, government will 
never be able to escape completely from its 
regulatory persona even where it approaches 
with offerings rather than threats. Currently, 
therefore, Nature Conservancy activities on 
private land provide a valuable adjunct to 
government initiatives.
However, any program, whether govern­
ment or private, which is fundamentally reliant 
on voluntary cooperation from landowners will 
inevitably suffer from problems of non­
cooperation. Ecosystems cut across property 
boundaries. Remnants are scattered across the
landscape. By refusing to cooperate, one 
person with a strategic landholding can 
effectively destroy a wildlife corridor or leave a 
destructive gap in a buffer zone. For those who 
will not cooperate with voluntary initiatives, 
there will have to be a regulatory fall-back 
position.
On top of this, it is unlikely that there will 
ever be enough resources either from private or 
public sources to enable the demand for 
biodiversity conservation to be met through 
free market solutions. It remains crucial that 
regulations continue to set the parameters 
within which negotiations are conducted and 
bargains reached, and that they take.a form 
which ensures that the focus of those negotia­
tions goes beyond land use restrictions and 
addresses the question of management.
The command and control alternative
Both the “take” provisions of section 9 of 
the Endangered Species Act, and the wetlands 
protection provisions of section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act set up command and control 
regulatory systems, subject to individually 
permitted exceptions.
Under the Clean Water Act, it is unlawful 
to “discharge ... dredged or fill material” into 
“navigable waters” without a permit. These 
concepts have been interpreted generously so 
as to prohibit a wide range of activities on a 
broad range of wetlands. The Corps of 
Engineers has the primary responsibility for 
issuing permits, but in doing so, it is required 
to apply Guidelines developed by the EPA in 
conjunction with the Corps. On top of this, 
the EPA has a power of veto over the grant of 
permits.
The direct relevance of the Endangered 
Species Act to private landholders stems from 
the fact that section 9 makes it unlawful to 
“take” a species of fish or wildlife listed as 
endangered, anywhere in the U.S., unless an 
incidental take permit has been granted under
section 10. It has been held in decisions by the 
courts, with one recent notable exception, that 
significant habitat modification or degradation 
will constitute a taking of a species. This 
potentially constitutes a significant limitation 
on private land use. On the other hand, it is 
only unlawful to damage or destroy plants on 
private land where this involves a knowing 
breach of state law.
At first sight, the prohibitive commands of 
these two pieces of legislation look impressive 
indeed. Experience teaches us, however, that 
where the commitment of the community to a 
legal obligation is equivocal, as here, where 
land use regulation in the interests of environ­
mental conservation clashes with deeply held 
values about the sanctity of private property, 
regulatory hernias will inevitably develop as 
agencies search for some level of “flexibility” to 
enable them to survive politically.
What “flexibility” means in practice is 
allowing projects to go ahead with conditions 
designed to mitigate environmental impact 
attached to them, as distinct from simply 
saying “no”. This approach may be acceptable 
when we seek to prevent land degradation or 
to protect water quality: for example, the 
threat of soil erosion can frequently be 
prevented by requiring land cleared of native 
vegetation to be immediately sown with 
pasture. But it frequently will not go far 
enough where our objective is conservation of 
biodiversity.
In this context, we may need a paradigm 
shift, so that the question becomes what level 
of development is compatible with the 
conservation of biodiversity, not how can we 
retain the maximum level of biodiversity 
consistent with development. The answer in 
many, cases may be “none”. At present the 
focus of regulatory systems is on how  can we 
manage to allow development to proceed on a 
particular site, not on whether we. should allow
Foothills prairie burning o jj m ow ed lines. Photo courtesy o f  The Nature Conservancy.
it to proceed there, or even at all.
Under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 
the regulatory net has been drawn wide, but 
the crucial question is how the permit system 
operates in practice. At one level, a substantial 
degree of precaution has been built into it. 
Under the Guidelines which the Corps of 
Engineers must apply, a permit must be 
refused if there is a practicable alternative 
which would have less adverse impact on the 
aquatic ecosystem and would not have other 
significant adverse environmental conse­
quences. Where a project is not water- 
dependent, the burden of proof is actually 
.reversed, so that it is presumed that practicable 
alternatives not involving wetlands are 
available.
Despite this, there are consistent allegations 
that section 404 is failing to stem the flow of 
wetland conversion. One prominent device 
used by the Corps to enhance “flexibility”, for 
example, was the “mitigation-buy-down”. This 
allowed it to grant a permit on the basis of 
compensatory mitigation - the offer of restored 
or created wetlands at another site - without 
first considering the possibility of complete 
avoidance (e.g. by finding an alternative site) 
or minimization of environmental impact.
This practice has now been abandoned and 
the Corps is committed to a sequencing 
process, whereby compensation of wetland 
values only becomes an option after potential 
impacts have been avoided to the maximum 
extent practicable, and those which cannot be 
avoided have been minimized.
In spite of this apparent downgrading of 
mitigation through compensation, the 
suspicion remains that wetland compensation 
is going to provide the technological fix and 
the “flexibility” which will allow development 
to proceed in most cases. Provided that 
practicable alternatives in the form of 
avoidance and minimization have been fully 
explored, there is a strong suggestion that
normally the go-ahead will be given on the 
basis that loss of wetland values and functions 
will be compensated.
This suspicion is reinforced by the Clinton 
Wetlands Plan of August 1993, with its firm 
endorsement of the use of mitigation banks. 
The Plan is as much about protecting 
landholders from regulatory burdens as it is 
about protecting wetlands from landholders.
It is one thing to espouse the restoration of 
degraded wetlands, or even the creation of new 
ones, as a means of recovering in some small 
way the values and functions which have 
already been lost. It is quite another to 
advocate restoration and creation as devices to 
excuse and legitimate the continued destruc­
tion of wetlands in relatively undisturbed 
condition. The science of wetland’s mitigation 
is still in its infancy, and the creation of 
wetlands substitutes are frequently not 
successful. Common sense suggests that some 
functions of wetlands may be more difficult to 
restore or create than others, and that habitat 
would be prominent on this list.
The permit system for allowing incidental 
takes of listed species under the Endangered 
Species Act is located in section 10. As under 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the 
provisions are framed in precautionary terms. 
They include a requirement that the applicant 
must submit a conservation plan. Before 
granting a permit, the Secretary of the Interior 
must be satisfied that the applicant will 
minimize and mitigate the impacts of the 
incidental take “to the maximum extent 
practicable”, that adequate funding for the 
plan will be provided, and that there will be 
procedures to deal with unforeseen circum­
stances.
In this case, unlike section 404, the permit 
system has, in fact, operated quite tightly. Very 
few conservation plans have been completed 
and very few incidental take permits have been 
issued.
However, the legislation has built into it 
other opportunities for front-end regulatory 
slippage, in particular the process by which a 
species gets on to the list in the first place.
Even though the prohibition on taking species 
bites like a pit bull when it does bite, the 
reality is that its protective bite is very 
selective. It impacts only a narrow class of 
species which have been identified after a very 
cautious, careful and relatively lengthy forward 
planning exercise.
One of the fundamental problems with the 
listing process is the way in which it deals with 
the question of scientific uncertainty. Many 
species are not listed because of the high degree 
of scientific proof demanded and the resources 
needed to gather it. A precautionary approach, 
on the other hand, requires us to carry out 
protective action even though the conservation 
status of a species cannot be proved according 
to traditional cannons of scientific proof. The 
argument is that it is better to put up with 
false positives rather than false negatives where 
we are dealing with irreversible effects. When 
it comes to facilitating development on 
wetlands by allowing compensatory mitigation, 
it is strange that we are much less concerned 
about the scientific uncertaintly associated 
with wetlands creation and restoration.
Even where a decision has been made that a 
listing is warranted, its formal processing can 
still be delayed because other pending listing 
proposals are seen to be more urgent, although 
a recent court settlement promises to address 
this situation.
Ultimately, these problems stem directly 
from the narrow species focus on which the 
legislation rests. How can we, for example, 
expect to produce scientific proof of the 
conservation status of the many invertebrate 
species not yet known to science? If the focus 
was on threatened and endangered ecosystems, 
it would be very much easier to satisfy even a 
very demanding burden of scientific proof. In 
other words, the heart of the problem 
ultimately lies with the level of the environ­
mental unit on which science is expected to 
focus rather than the demand that science be 
allowed to play a role in the decision-making.
Incentives: compensation or 
management payments?
The question which must be asked is 
whether command and control regulation by 
itself can hope to address the issue of 
biodiversity retention and management on 
privately owned land. A wise policy response 
would move away from exclusive reliance on a 
coercive approach and seek to attract greater 
cooperation from private landholders. At the 
same time, it is clear from the earlier analysis 
of strategies based on voluntary agreement 
between landholders and the public or private 
sector that parameter-setting command and 
control regulation cannot be abandoned 
altogether.
An alternative strategy involves combining 
regulation with the provision of compensation 
in those situations where controls actually bite. 
From one perspective, this is already the
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position in the United States. Under the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, private land 
use regulation at a certain level of impact must 
be accompanied by just compensation. But 
compensation is only available grudgingly, on 
an ad hoc basis through the courts, and the 
Outcome is difficult to predict. The result is 
that the regulatory system loses all of the 
advantages of a system capable of softening the 
blows of the stick by offering an easily grasped 
carrot.
In Australia, environmental and natural 
resources legislation bearing on private land 
emanates primarily from the states, rather than 
the Commonwealth Parliament. But there is 
nothing in any of the state constitutions which 
guarantees compensation for landholders, even 
in situations where they are totally excluded 
from their land by State action. Section 
51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution 
does provide that any “acquisition” of property 
by instrumentalities of the Commonwealth 
Government must be made on just terms. 
However, in the Tasmanian Dam case 
{Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 
1), three of the four members of the High 
Court who dealt with the issue made it clear 
that even the severe regulatory restrictions on 
land use in Tasmania imposed under the 
World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 
of 1983 did not constitute an “acquisition” 
requiring the payment of compensation.
The absence of a constitutional guarantee 
of compensation for regulatory takings in 
Australia does not prevent debate about 
whether compensation should be paid, but the 
primary forum is Parliament. If a decision is 
made to pay compensation, it will be the result 
of a general formula worked out in the context 
of particular legislation. This contrasts with 
the position in the United States where not 
only the question of the amount payable, but 
the prior issue of whether compensation 
should be paid at all, is addressed through case 
by case decisions, made ultimately by the 
highest court in the land.
In fact provision for compensation is rarely 
made in Australian land use legislation. One 
significant exception to this is of particular 
relevance to biodiversity conservation. The 
South Australian Native Vegetation Manage­
ment Act of 1985 prohibited land clearing and 
woodcutting without consent from the Native 
Vegetation Authority, subject to a number of 
exemptions, including grazing by domestic 
stock and clearance of regrowth and shrub 
invasion in certain circumstances. Where an 
activity was not exempt, owners of land who 
were given a conditional approval or were 
refused consent could generally insist on the 
Minister entering into a heritage agreement. 
Once this had been concluded, the landholder 
was entitled to the payment of “a sum of 
money” based on diminution in the market 
value of the land.
The most notable effect of this approach 
was a significant tightening in the granting of 
permits. Of the total area for which applica­
tions were made between 1986 and 1989
involving broadacre clearing, about 94% was 
protected by outright refusals. This compared 
with a figure of 80% approvals under the 
previous regulatory system, which relied solely 
on command and control.
This suggests that the availability of some 
form of recompense may make it easier for 
regulatory agencies to say “no” to develop­
ment. The hypothesis is that they are less likely 
to search for the “flexibility” which they 
manage to find in command and control 
regulation when they are in a position to 
soften the blow of outright refusal by offering 
something in return.
In addition, the availability of some sort of 
financial return will inevitably make landhold­
ers less hostile to restrictions on land use and 
make enforcement easier. Besides, manage­
ment is required, and disgruntled landholders 
make poor managers.
The real issue is not whether landholders 
should receive some form of financial payment 
in conjunction with command and control 
regulation, but what form that payment should 
take. By providing compensation for losses, we 
allow landholders to externalize the problem 
and deny that they have any responsibility for 
the conservation of biodiversity. Compensa­
tion is backward-looking and has nothing to 
say about the matter of future management of 
the land. Instead of landholders being given 
some degree of ownership of the issue of 
biodiversity conservation and a real stake in 
addressing it, we allow them to wash their 
hands of it.
Unlike compensation, management or 
stewardship payments are forward looking and 
are based on work carried out by the land­
holder rather than on the market value of the 
land. They are more equitable than compensa­
tion insofar as they constitute payment for 
worlt performed, as opposed to being based on
what are frequently chance factors relating to 
the development value of land. A strategy 
which offers management payments to 
landholders will be particularly appropriate in 
situations where the conservation of remnant 
vegetation is at stake, and agricultural 
landholders want to remain on the land, even 
though their existing operations are marginal.
Management must take into account the 
singularities of each piece of land in light of 
the complexity of ecosystems and the fact that 
our current knowledge is very limited. From 
this perspective, building on to the knowledge 
base of individual landholders, advised and 
supported by the expertise of government, 
might prove to be a more efficient strategy 
than handing over complete management 
responsibility for scattered patches to govern­
ment agencies.
Claims for compensation on the grounds 
that a “taking” under the fifth amendment has 
occurred would not likely succeed if govern­
ment was prepared to pay landholders to 
manage land for the purposes of biodiversity 
conservation, thereby providing an economi­
cally beneficial use.
Paying farmers and pastoralists on marginal 
land to manage it for biodiversity conservation 
would provide an alternative form of income 
support to agricultural price support schemes. 
Society is simply supporting the production of 
an alternative commodity - biodiversity.
Conclusion
The argument which has been made is that 
neither fully voluntary nor command-and- 
control programs are likely to achieve 
meaningful conservation of biological diversity 
on private land. An amalgam of a command- 
and-control regulatory framework and a far- 
reaching program of management payments to 
landholders for the production of biodiversity 
is proposed.
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for Colorado’s §401 Program.” Speakers will 
be Barbara Green, of Hale, Pratt, Midgley, 
Hackstaff & Goldberg; Marcia Hughes, 
Denver attorney; and Paul Frohardt, 
Administrator, Colorado Water Quality 
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MacDonnell.
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Dean Gene R. N ichol 
(left) a t C enter’s sem i­
annual Advisory 
Board meeting.
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the basis upon which the Commission made 
its recommendations to Congress in One 
Third o f  the Nation's Lands. The Center 
reports will he made available through the 
University of Colorado Law School library.
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Calendar
Fall H o t  T opics C L E  lunch  series:
♦ Mon. Sept. 19: “Dolan v. City o f  
Tigard: Implications for Developers and 
for Cities and Counties”
♦ Fri. Oct. 21: “PUD No. 1 of Jefferson 
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the Lower Colorado River Basin.”
Annual W estern Lands C onference:
♦ Weds.—Fri., September 28—30, 1994: 
“Who Governs the Public Lands: 
Washington? the West? the 
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